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This paper assesses the determinants and effects of credit constraints on the productivity of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Cameroon. Use is made of the Cameroon enterprise survey data 
collected by the World Bank in 2009 and an endogenous switching regression model. Results show that 
interest rates, size of enterprise, size of loan, size of collateral, maturity of loans and legal status of 
enterprises are major sources of credit constraints faced by SMEs. Results also indicate that medium 
enterprises are more credit constrained than small enterprises; meanwhile the effects of credit 
constraints affect small enterprises more than medium enterprises. Credit constrained firms have lower 
levels of productivity relative to unconstrained firms. These results have implications for the creation of 
credit bureaux, prudential stringency and rationalization of the Cameroon tax system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent enterprise survey conducted by the National 
Institute of Statistics (NIS) (NIS, 2009) reveals that there 
are 93 969 enterprises in Cameroon out of which 99.2% 
are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).They 
account for 62% of permanent employees and 31% of 
turnover before tax of all enterprises in Cameroon (NIS, 
2009).The importance of SMEs has been underlined as a 
focal point of the vision 2035 of the 2009 growth and 
employment strategy paper (GESP) of the government of 
Cameroon (Government of Cameroon, 2009). The 
creation of the Ministry of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, Social Economy and Handicraft in December 
2004 is an indicator of the importance of this sector to the 
economy of Cameroon. 
In general, SMEs have been reporting difficulties in 
financing their activities (Beck, 2004; Slotty, 2009).The 
enterprise survey(World Bank/IFC, 2008) shows that 51% 
of small enterprises (5-20 employees) and 45% of 
medium enterprises (21-99 employees) in sub-Saharan 
Africa consider access to finance as their major obstacle 
and this reduces with size. The same survey also 
indicates that only 38% of big (100 and more employees) 
enterprises mention access to finance as their major 
obstacle. Results from a survey carried out by NIS in 
2009 shows that 37.6 % of the SMEs in Cameroon have 
problems of access to credit (NIS, 2009). The 2009 and 
2010 Doing Business reports show that enterprises in 
Cameroon passed from 131st position in 2009 to 135th in 
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2010 as far as access to credit is concerned (World 
Bank, 2010).  
Apart from the problem of financing SMEs, bad 
business environment has been identified as one of the 
main predicaments to their development. The business 
environment in Cameroon is characterised by corruption, 
long administrative procedures, insufficient or lack of 
infrastructures like roads, electricity, poor legal system 
and very high transaction costs and custom duties at the 
ports of shipment. These problems force SMEs to use 
inappropriate methods of production or out-dated 
technology (NIS, 2009).The problem of access to credit 
has always been and remains a major drawback for the 
growth of SMEs in Cameroon (Berk et al., 2006). The 
government of Cameroon recently created a bank for 
financing SMEs. Although this bank is still in the process 
of implantation, it may respond to the important 
constraints that SMEs face in financing their activities 
only if the general business environment is improved.  
Despite the important role of SMEs in the economies of 
the developing world as one of the major employers with 
very high contribution to GDP, recent research provide 
evidence that SMEs face greater financing obstacles than 
large firms (Beck et al., 2005; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2006; and Beck et al., 2006). Ayyagari et al. (2007) show 
that finance, crime, and political instability directly affect 
the rate of growth of firms, with finance being the most 
robust variable affecting firms’ growth rate. Access to 
credit by SMEs is extremely limited. Banking penetration 
of the private sector is very low in Cameroon; it is only 
averaging 18% of GDP (World Bank, 2006) and it is only 
major corporations or big enterprises that benefit from the 
bulk of financing.  
This paper outlines the principal credit constraints 
faced by SMEs and analyses the effects of credit 
constraints on the productivity of credit constrained and 
unconstrained firms in Cameroon. In this context, this 
paper makes a contribution by extending knowledge on 
credit constraints in Cameroon and empirically evaluating 
the impact of credit constraints on the productivity of 
SMEs. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section II summarizes recent literature on credit 
constraints faced by SMEs, section III dwells on the 
methodology; while Section IV presents the results and 
discussions. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A model of imperfect information, uncertainty and credit 
rationing was published by Dwight and Russell (1976). It 
is assumed in this model that there are both ″honest″ and 
″dishonest″ borrowers. Honest borrowers are those that 
accept loan contracts they are sure they would repay on 
time; while dishonest borrowers are those that accept 
loan contracts they know they won’t be able to repay on 
time. The model shows that the loan market is composed  
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of borrowers who detain more information about their 
likelihood of default than the lenders. In the case of a 
perfect competition market there are two cases, in the 
first case; borrowers are rationed in the amounts they can 
repay so there is no default. In the alternative case, the 
market can alternate in an unstable fashion with lenders 
entering and making short-run profits and then 
disappearing in the long-run. In reality loan markets may 
not exhibit any of these features. Although bank failures 
may absorb a percentage of the default, the market does 
not show instability as predicted by the model. Entry into 
the loan market entails non-price terms such as 
collateral, and down payment requirements. Government 
intervention may also be justified as one of the solutions 
to market failures. Changes in the legal system may 
equally correct bank failures. 
The credit and financial markets are considered in 
institutional economics as institutional structures and 
arrangements that can mediate the exchange process 
and minimise transaction costs. The nature of costs is 
very important because it determines the structure of the 
market (Saleh, 2004). For example; in a country where 
transaction costs are relatively low, borrowers would be 
able to finance their projects with bank loans instead of 
their small savings or ask for help from friends or family. 
It is important to bear in mind that these costs are 
generally a function of factors such as uncertainty, 
structure of the market, economic rationality and the 
ability of agents to access opportunities. Consequently, in 
a situation of uncertainty like that which characterises the 
credit market in Cameroon, it is difficult or expensive to 
negotiate credit contracts that take into consideration all 
the above exigencies. In addition, the fact that this market 
is dominated by some banks limits competition thus 
giving them market power that can influence the cost of 
transactions.  
Due to information asymmetry, external funds are 
imperfect substitutes of internal funds (Braun and Larrain, 
2003). Thus, enterprises with higher cost of information 
are more likely to be credit constrained. Empirically the 
credit constrained statuses of SMEs are generally 
identified by their sensibility to investment (Bönte and 
Nielen, 2010). The principle behind this reasoning is that 
due to credit constraints external funds are more 
expensive than internal funds. 
The development of the financial system has also been 
used as an important tool to determine the vulnerability of 
SMEs to be credit constraint (Laeven, 2003). Better 
protection of property rights increases external financing 
of small firms significantly more than it does for large 
firms, particularly due to the differential impact it has on 
bank and supplier finance (Beck et al. 2004). Beck et al. 
(2005) show that the effect of obstacles on firm growth is 
smaller in countries with better-developed financial and 
legal systems. Using cross-industry, cross-country data 
for 44 countries and 36 industries in the manufacturing 
sector, Beck et al. (2005) show that financial development  
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exerts a disproportionately large positive effect on the 
growth of industries that are naturally composed of more 
small firms. Their results suggest that the furniture 
industry (an industry with many small firms) should grow 
1.4% per annum faster than the spinning industry (an 
industry with relatively fewer small firms) in Canada (a 
country with a well-developed financial system) than in 
India (which has a lower level of financial development). 
Mina et al. (2011) developed a model with inspiration 
from that of Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997) which is based 
on the situation prevalent in African economies where 
SMEs are credit constrained and are limited by lack of 
collateral. The model is applied to African countries 
where formal and productive private sector is under-
developed. The empirical implementation was based on 
panel data involving 20 African countries. The results 
from the study show that new enterprises are considered 
as risky. It also highlights the importance of the legal 
system in reducing information asymmetry and enforcing 
credit contracts, which is still a big problem in Africa. The 
lack of competition is also identified as one of the factors 
leading to limited access to credit by SMEs, engendering 
high collateral demands. Due to this, we have the 
cohabitation of excess liquidity and credit constraints, 
thus interventions aimed at reducing cost of credit and 
strengthening of the legal system are required (Calvin, 
2008). 
Tieguhong et al. (2012) highlighted the problem faced 
by SMEs through an analysis of the financial gap of 151 
pilot enterprises (63 in Cameroon and 88 in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC). The total capital 
required for the development of these 151 pilot 
enterprises was evaluated at US$1 335 025 out of which 
the own contribution of the enterprises was US$ 843 433 
(63%) and the other US$ 492 159 (37%) was subject to 
external assistance. They also found that there was 
consistent variation in capital requirements, own 
contributions and levels of assistance sought among the 
enterprises. The research also shows that the level of 
assistance sought in Cameroon is less than that in the 
DRC. 
Ngoa and Niyonsaba (2012) used a multinomial logit 
model to verify the impact of entrepreneurial social capital 
on the credit access of SMEs in Cameroon. A sample of 
413 Cameroonian SMEs where questioned and five 
indicators where used; the ratio of family labour, 
government support, belonging to a business network, 
personal relation with the client bank and the level of 
human capital predominant in the enterprise. The results 
show that only the three last variables positively affect 
access to bank credit. However, their effects and 
amplitudes vary with respect to the maturity of the loan. 
The study also shows that thanks to social capital, 
SMEs that have access to bank credit survive for a longer 
period than the others. The present paper contributes to 
a better understanding of the impact of credit constraints 
on the productivity of SMEs in Cameroon. 
 
 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Data 
 
The dataset used in this study is secondary data from the World 
Bank 2009 enterprise survey in Cameroon. The enterprise survey 
aims at factors that shape the business environment of the 
economy. It examines the accommodating and constraining factors 
to enterprise growth. The accommodating factors are those that 
contribute to the growth and productivity of the enterprise and also 
the economy. Meanwhile, constraining factors are obstacles to 
sustainable development and growth of enterprises. 
The enterprise survey covers small, medium and large firms. The 
survey is administered to representative firms of the non-agricultural 
formal private economy. It includes the manufacturing sector, 
service sector, and transport and construction sectors. Public 
utilities, health care, government services and financial sectors are 
not included in the sample. A wide variety of quantitative and 
qualitative information was collected in Cameroon through face to 
face interviews with firm managers and owners on diverse topics; 
infrastructure, trade, finance, regulations, taxes, business licensing, 
corruption, crime, informality, innovation, labour and perceptions 
about obstacles to doing business in Cameroon. 
In Cameroon, business owners and managers of 363 firms were 
interviewed from April through October 2009. The survey was 
carried out in 03 main towns in Cameroon: Douala, Yaoundé and 
Bafoussam. The enterprise survey was organised in two stages, in 
the first stage a telephone screening was organised to confirm 
eligibility and to schedule an interview. In the second stage, a face 
to face interview with a top manager of the firm was conducted. 
When needed, follow-up questions and corrections were 
implemented in person, by phone, through emails or web interface.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
In this research, the definition of credit constrained firm follows from 
Casey and O’Toole (2013). In this regard, a SME is said to be credit 
constrained if it requested more loans than was supplied, did not 
apply for a loan because of unfavourable credit conditions or if it 
required loans but was unable to borrow. When estimating the 
impact of credit constraints on productivity, two issues come up 
(Maddala, 1986). The first step to estimate SMEs credit constraints 
is by a probit function with the following specification: 
 
                                                   (1) 
 
where C* is a latent continuous variable, which determines the 
credit constraint status of a SMEs. It takes two values;  
     
   (credit constraint) 
(credit unconstraint)         
 
The SME credit constraint criterion equation is a reduced form 
equation, i.e. the condition of whether a SME is credit constrained 
or unconstrained, and is given by an index model,   which is a 
latent variable that cannot be observed but can be estimated via 
assumptions on how it is characterized,  represents a vector of 
explanatory variables, α is a vector of parameters to be estimated 
and  is a random error term, distributed as a normal function with 
mean zero and the variance normalised to one in order to allow for 
estimation of coefficients. Finally SME productivity equation is 
estimated by the following regression equation; regime 1 represents  
 
 
 
 
credit constrained SMEs and regime 0 represents unconstrained 
SMEs. 
Productivity of credit constrained SMEs is given as equation 2: 
 
 i                                             (2) 
 
Productivity of credit unconstrained SMEs is given as equation 3: 
 
                                            (3) 
 
Where  and  are the productivity for credit constrained and 
unconstrained SMEs,  and are vectors of the explanatory 
variables for credit constrained and unconstrained SMEs 
respectively, while and  are vector of corresponding 
parameters to be estimated. The terms  and  are random 
error terms, distributed as normal function with zero means. 
As demonstrated in Maddala (1983), the expected value of the 
error terms  1i and  0i are not zero. This is because the 
counterfactual productivity that credit constrained SMEs would have 
had without being constrained is not observed. In addition, we do 
not observed the productivity that SMEs that are not credit 
constrained would have had if they were constrained. If we could 
estimate such counterfactuals, this problem could be solved. This is 
known as the sample selectivity problem and is well known in 
economic literature (Heckman, 1979; Puhani, 2000; Lung-Fei, 
2001). This makes direct OLS estimation of equations (2) and (3) 
inappropriate. In this study, a strategy developed by labour 
economists is adopted; mostly by Heckman (1979).This problem is 
addressed by calculating the inverse Mills ratio from equation (1), 
and inserted as explanatory variables in (2) and (3). The second 
problem with this model is that the annual sales revenues 
(productivity) of SMEs depend on the credit equation criterion and 
also on other characteristics of the SMEs. Therefore, the errors of 
the credit constraint criteria are correlated with that of the 
productivity of credit constrained SMEs and unconstrained SMEs. 
Thus, there is a problem of endogeneity. Due to these issues, the 
OLS method is inappropriate to estimate the coefficients; the 
maximum likelihood method is used. To achieve this, stata 
movestay command is used, which uses the maximum likelihood 
function to estimate the coefficients and does a joint estimation of a 
probit model for the credit constraint status equation and the 
regression equations of regime 1 and regime 0 respectively. 
In order to capture the unobserved characteristics of SMEs that 
affect productivity, the inverse Mills ratio is introduced in the 
expected SME productivity. The expected productivity of SMEs 
conditional to credit constrained regime can be computed as;  
 
     =  
                                =                  (4a)  
                                =  
 
In the same way, the expected SME productivity, unconditional to 
the constrained regime is given by;  
 
    =  
                               =        (4b) 
                                =  
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Where y is the SME productivity,  and are vectors of the 
explanatory variables for credit constrained and unconstrained 
SMEs respectively, while β is a vector of corresponding parameters 
to be estimated. The terms  and  are random error terms, 
distributed as normal function with zero means. The terms ∅ and Ф 
are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. According 
to Greene (2003), the ratio ∅ and Ф evaluated at αz is the inverse 
Miller ratio (λ). This reflects the truncation of a normal distribution 
atα’z. 
could be 
added to the  and  vectors respectively in equation (5a) and 
(5b) to yield: 
 
=              (5a)  
  
    =            (5b)
                                
The covariance of the credit constrained criterion equation (1), and 
the credit constrained SMEs productivity equation (5a),and the 
credit unconstrained criterion equation (1), and the credit 
constrained SMEs productivity equation (5b) are represented by the 
multiplicative terms and  , respectively. This 
covariance can be split into the standard deviation of the 
appropriate equations  and the correlations and . 
However  cannot be estimated and is normalise to 1 because of 
the structure of the model and the nature of the derived data 
(Greene, 2003). 
To measure the endogeneity of the credit constrained condition, 
a test of whether  and  are statistically different from zero is 
required, since estimates of  and  show correlation of the 
“unobservable” of the credit constrained criterion equation with the 
“observables” of the credit constrained and unconstrained SME 
productivity equations, respectively. If  and  are zero then the 
credit constraint is exogenous, and it would be necessary to include 
the credit constrained criterion equation in estimating the effects of 
credit constraints on the productivity of SMEs. 
This system can be estimated in two steps. The two steps 
approach required the estimation of probit function (1), which is first 
estimated by maximum likelihood. The predicted values from the 
probit function are then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, 
which is subsequently included as an explanatory variable when 
estimating equation (5a) and (5b). A single parameter is estimated 
for σ1ρ1 and σ0ρ0 because of the linear structure of these equations. 
The one-step approach (endogenous switching regression model) 
entails the estimation of β1,β0 and α for starting values equations 
(1),(5a) and (5b) jointly by maximum likelihood. With the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) equation, separate estimates of ρ1 and 
σ1 and then ρ0 and σ0 are possible. In a nutshell, the endogenous 
switching model is implemented in two stages. In the first stage, a 
probit model is estimated to detect enterprises that are credit 
constrained, while in the second stage, simultaneous equations are 
used to estimate productivity of constrained enterprises compared 
to unconstrained enterprises. This implies two dependent variables, 
one at each stage. From the above we can specify two hypotheses;  
 
• Non-credit constrained SMEs outperform their credit constrained 
counterparts 
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Table 1. Variables selected for study. 
  
Variable Nature Expected sign  
(positive(+), 
negative (-)) 
Description 
Access to credit (cc) Dependent  1 if credit non constrained (have a line of credit 
or a loan or does or has enough funds and 0 
otherwise (loan application rejected or did not 
apply because of long procedures to get a loan, 
high interest rate, high collateral demands, size 
and maturity of loan insufficient, did not think it 
would be approved) 
Log of  annual sales(sales) Dependent  It evaluates the productivity of SMEs 
Size of Enterprise  Independent Small(+) 
Medium (+) 
Large(-) 
Dummy variable (1=yes and 0=no) 
 Small 
 Medium 
 Large 
Current legal status Independent Sole proprietor(-) 
Partnership (+) 
Limited partnership (-) 
Dummy variable : (1=yes and 0=no) 
 Sole proprietor 
 Partnership 
 Limited partnership 
Top female manager   Independent + 1= yes and 0=no 
Average interest rate Independent - It is the rate charged by banks when you 
borrow. 
Size of Collateral Independent + It is the log of the value of collateral 
Credit history Independent + 1 if the enterprise had applied for a loan before 
and 0 if not 
Age of the enterprise Independent - It is counted from 2009 minus the year it was 
officially registered 
Bank account Independent - 1= yes and 0=no 
Existing assets Independent - 1= yes and 0=no 
 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
 
 
• Credit constrains have significant negative effects on the 
productivity of SMEs 
 
 
Presentation of variables 
 
The two endogenous variables are access to credit and productivity. 
  
Access to credit (cc): it is a variable which is used to estimate the 
probability of an enterprise being credit constrained or 
unconstrained. It is a binary variable with outcome zero or one 
 
Productivity (log annual sales): it is a variable that is used to 
evaluate the performance of credit constrained and unconstrained 
enterprises. It is a continuous variable. The variables of interest are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Determinants of SMEs credit constraints in 
Cameroon 
 
The results in Table 2 below shows that the probability  of  
being credit constraint increases with increase in size of 
enterprises. This can be seen by higher positive value of 
the coefficient of small and medium enterprises; these 
coefficients are significant at 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. This phenomenon contradicts the findings of 
Beck et al.(2005) and Beck et al.(2006) that Small firms 
face greater financing obstacles than medium-sized 
firms. This is mainly because many small enterprises 
easily get loans from credit unions and microfinance 
institutions because of their personal relationship with the 
microfinance operators. The manager of the microfinance 
knows the owners of the small enterprises in person, their 
houses and the location of their business centers. This 
makes it easier to give out loans to small enterprises, this 
confirms the findings of Ngoa and Niyonsaba (2012) 
where there was a positive and significant impact of 
relationship with bank on credit access in Cameroon, and 
small enterprises typically lack the capacity to deal with 
commercial banks. Another reason is the over liquidity 
phenomenon in the CEMAC region where banks receive 
short-term  deposits  and  consequently  cannot  give  out 
Piabuo et al.          209 
 
 
 
Table 2. Probit regression estimates of determinants of SMEs credit constraints condition: endogenous 
switching regression -part 1. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistics 
Size of Enterprise    
Small 0.823166* 0.4358359 1.89 
Medium 0.9803419** 0.4752202 2.06 
    
Legal status of Enterprise    
Sole proprietorship -1.150219*** 0.3602106 -3.19 
Partnership -0.7260604 0.4527223 -1.60 
Limited partnership 1.82318 1.430684 1.27 
Experience of top manager -0.0029877 0.0164781 -0.18 
Interest rate 0.1541037*** 0.0282023 5.46 
Age of enterprise 0.007695 0.0113611 0.68 
Size of loan 0.1439886*** 0.0274468 5.25 
Size of collateral -0.0167842 0.0217931 -0.77 
Credit history/relationship with bank 2.01287*** 0.4348153 4.63 
Existence of fixed assets -0.6887105*** 0.2996057 -2.30 
Have saving account -0.1153333 0.4613401 -0.25 
Top manager female 1.092383*** 0.4519805 2.42 
Constant -3.765733*** 0.7713068 -4.88 
 
Notes:***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability 
respectively. Source: By the author using the switching regression technique SMEs survey in stata SMEs data 
collected by the world bank. Number of obs   =  363; Number of obs   =  363; Wald chi2(8)   =   60.67; Prob> chi2        
=  0.0000; Log likelihood  = -813.12613 ; LR test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) =  13.74 Prob> chi2 = 0.0002. 
 
 
 
long-term loans. In this regard, only small enterprises that 
demand short-term loans at higher interest rates can 
have access to credit, making medium enterprises to be 
more credit constrained. 
As far as the legal status of the enterprise is concerned, 
the probability of being credit constrained significantly 
decreases for sole proprietors at the 1% level. This is 
principally because sole proprietors have personal 
relationships with their microfinance or credit union 
institutions so the problem of information asymmetry is 
highly reduced and they usually demand short-term 
loans.  Partnerships have lower risk while limited partners 
have a positive non-significant relationship with the 
probability of being credit constrained. 
The probability of an enterprise being credit constrained 
increases with interest rate. This is to be expected 
because it is the price which borrowers have to pay for 
the credit. Some enterprises may not apply for a loan 
because they feel the interest rate is too high, not 
because they have sufficient funds. It is also used by 
banks as a measure to cover other costs of obtaining 
information, especially in an economy like that of 
Cameroon with high information asymmetry (Williamson, 
1987). 
The age of an enterprise has a positive non-significant 
relation with the probability of a SME being credit 
constrained. That is, the age of older SMEs have very 
little or no influence on the probability of being credit 
constrained. 
The bigger the size of the loan demanded by 
enterprises the higher the probability of the SMEs being 
credit constrained. Indeed, the effect of bigger loans may 
increase the probability of an enterprise being credit 
constrained by about 14%. This is because bigger loans 
are likely to require bigger collateral or the maturity period 
demanded by the borrower may be longer. This contrasts 
with the vision of most banks that are more willing to give 
out short-term loans.  
Collateral is often demanded as one of the alternative 
measures by banks to reduce the risk of default by 
borrowers. The size of this collateral (Table 2) is 
negatively related to the probability of the enterprise 
being credit constraint. Some enterprises may not be 
awarded the loan they demanded or only awarded a 
partial amount because they do not have the required 
collateral. Some SMEs may just decide not to apply for a 
loan or line of credit because they feel the collateral 
needs are prohibited for them. So the higher the value of 
the collateral, the lower the probability of being credit 
constrained. 
When enterprises have fixed assets the probability of 
those enterprises being credit constrained is reduced. 
This is so because the enterprises have assets that can 
be presented as collateral. Thus, an enterprise can 
borrow more when she possesses substantial collateral. 
This is a great cover for the enterprises because it is an 
assurance to the banker that the loan would be paid even 
if  it  means  selling  the collateral.  From  our  results, the 
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probability of a SME being credit constrained reduces by 
68% when the SME have fixed assets. This variable is 
significant at the 1% level. 
Having a bank account by a SME is an important step 
towards obtaining loans or lines of credit from financial 
institutions. This variable is negatively related to the 
credit constrained condition of SMEs.  
Access to credit is highly gender sensitive. Enterprises 
with women top managers increase their probability of 
being credit constrained - coefficient is significant at 1% 
level. Female managers in Cameroon still do not have 
the same rating as men to the extent that bankers find it 
easier to give out loan to a male top manager rather than 
a female manager.  
 
 
Effects of credit constraints on the productivity of 
SMEs in Cameroon 
 
The log of annual sales revenue is used as an indicator 
of the productivity of SMEs it models the probability of a 
variable increasing or reducing sales revenue with 
respect to the credit constraint status of the firm. The 
results of the effects of credit constraints on the 
productivity of SMEs can be seen in Table 3. 
 
 
Credit constrained equation 
 
The first panel of Table 3 shows that small- and medium-
size enterprises have negative and significant effects on 
sales revenue, but the absolute magnitude of the 
coefficient on small enterprises larger than that of 
medium-sized firms. This means that credit constrained 
small and medium firms have lower annual sales 
revenue, but that of small enterprises is much lower than 
that of medium-sized enterprises. Thus, the consequence 
of credit constraints is more for small firms than for 
medium firms. 
As far as the legal status of SMEs is concerned, 
partnerships, sole proprietors and limited partners all 
have a negative and significant effect on annual sales 
revenue. However, this is larger (by 0.64) for sole 
proprietors compared to partners, while limited partners 
have the lowest negative value. The implication is that 
sole proprietors and partners are highly touched by the 
credit constrained status than limited partners. 
The experience of the manager has a positive effect on 
the annual sales revenue of SMEs. There is a 2% 
increase in sales revenue due to a unit increase in the 
experience of the manager. Interest rates have negative 
and significant effects on the annual sales revenue of 
enterprises. This means that an increase in the interest 
rate for credit constrained firms reduces their productivity. 
 
 
The credit unconstrained equation 
 
The second panel of Table 3 shows the estimated results  
 
 
 
 
of the credit unconstrained firms when the log of annual 
sales is the dependent variable. As far as the size (small, 
medium, large) of SMEs are concerned, they all have 
negative and significant effects on the annual sales 
revenue. Small firms have a higher negative (0.51) effect 
than medium firms. This means that even when firms are 
not credit constrained, small  firms record lower annual 
sales revenue compared to medium firms while the 
coefficients for credit constraints firms is much lower. 
Limited partners have a positive and significant effect 
on annual sales revenue, while partners and sole 
proprietors have negative effects on annual sales 
revenue. 
At the level of management of the enterprise, the 
experience of the top manager has a positive and 
significant effect at 10% level on sales revenue. Sales 
revenue tends to increase by 2.5% with a year increase 
in experience of the top manager 
The correlation coefficients rho_1 indicates the 
correlation between the credits constrained situation and 
the effects of credit constraints on credit constrained 
firms. The value is negative and statistically significant. 
The value is 0.82, which is a very strong correlation, 
meaning that being credit constrained has significant 
adverse effects on sales revenue (Table 3). Thus, sales 
revenue tends to reduce because of credit constraints. 
The correlation coefficients rho_2 indicates the 
correlation between the credits constrained situation and 
the effects of credit constraints on credit unconstrained 
firms. The value is negative but it is only significant at the 
10% level. The value is 0.43, reflecting a weak correlation. 
Therefore, credit unconstrained firms turn to have higher 
annual sales revenue compared to credit constrained 
firms, which confirms the observation that credit 
constraints have significant negative effects on the 
productivity of SMEs. These results show that credit 
constraint is endogenous and thus it is necessary to 
model the credit constraint criterion equation in estimating 
the effects of credit constraints on the productivity of 
SMEs. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This paper outlined the important role that the size of 
collaterals may have on the probability of a firm being 
credit constraint. The probit regression showed that when 
the size of the collateral is large the probability of SMEs 
being credit constrained is reduced by 1.6%. Thus, 
having collateral in Cameroon is a good guarantee to 
secure credit from a microfinance institution. On the other 
hand, having fixed assets is a big guarantee to have a 
loan in Cameroon; the probability of credit constraints 
reduces by 68.87%.  Size of loan and interest rate are the 
principal elements which increase the probability of 
enterprises being credit constraints; they increase this 
probability by 14.39 and 13.41% respectively. 
Piabuo et al.          211 
 
 
 
Table 3. Effects of credit constraint on productivity of SME, estimated by maximum likelihood switching 
regression - switching regression (part 2). 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistics 
Credit constrained equation 
Size of Enterprise    
Small -2.575423 *** 0.5373712 -4.79 
Medium -1.175191*** 0.488681 -2.40 
    
Legal status of Enterprise    
Sole proprietorship -1.185184 *** 0.4577519 -2.59 
Partnership -2.233041*** 0.6799892 -3.28 
Limited partnership -0.4192783 0.8429436 -0.50 
Experience of top manager 0.0212495 0.0209463 1.01 
Interest rate -0.0847042*** 0.035304 -2.40 
Top female manager -1.249014 1.000087 -1.25 
Constant 22.50572*** 0.7806397 28.83 
    
Credit unconstrained equation 
Size of Enterprise    
Small -2.18498 *** 0.372059 -5.87 
Medium -1.670859*** 0.3736549 -4.47 
    
Legal status of Enterprise    
Sole proprietorship -1.150219*** 0.3602106 -3.19 
Partnership -0.510959 0.4795876 -1.07 
Limited partnership 1.556253 1.978229 0.79 
Experience of top manager .0252573* 0.0143036 1.77 
Top female manager -0.5175267 -0.5175267 -1.37 
Constant 20.01186 *** 0.4594352 43.56 
/lns1  0.7837656 *** .0757205 10.35 
/lns2 0.6761087*** .0467539 14.46 
|r1  -1.180721 *** 0.5467111 -2.16 
r2 -0.4719994 0.3090944 -1.53 
sigma_1  2.189702 .1658053  
sigma_2  1.966212 0.091928  
rho_1  -0.8276789 0.1721854  
rho_2  -0.4398134 .2493045  
 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance of estimated coefficient at 1, 5, 10 percent levels of probability respectively. Source: By the 
author using the switching regression technique SMEs survey in stata SMEs data collected by the World Bank. Number of obs   =        
363; Wald chi2 (8)  =   60.67; Prob> chi2  =  0.0000; Log likelihood   = -813.12613; LR test of indep. eqns. :  chi2(1) =     13.74 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0002. 
 
 
 
The effects of credit constraints on the productivity of 
SMEs was captured by the coefficients of the variables, 
but the correlation coefficients rho_1 and rho_2 gave the 
global effects of credit constraints on SMEs. The 
correlation coefficient, rho_1, indicates the correlation 
between the credits constrained equation and the effects 
of credit constraints on credit constrained firms. The 
value was negative and statistically significant indicating 
a strong correlation between the two models. The 
implication is that being credit constrained has significant 
adverse effects  on  sales  revenue,  thus  sales  revenue 
tends to reduce because of credit constraints. Therefore, 
credit constrained firms would turn to have lower sales 
revenue compared to their credit unconstrained 
counterparts.  
These findings have implication for increasing SMEs 
access to credit by reducing information asymmetry and 
strengthening prudential stringency. For example, the 
government of Cameroon could accompany the creation 
of the public bank for SMEs, with an effective credit 
registry bureau, which indicates firms listed in the private 
or public domain together with their credit histories.  
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Financial institutions could, then, be given the permission 
to easily access this information. This would reduce 
information asymmetry and enable the banks to be able 
to give out loans to SMEs that do not have huge 
collaterals or at lower interest rates subject to stringent 
regional prudential controls. It would encourage loans of 
higher value to be given out for investment to qualified 
SMEs and also increase employment opportunities. 
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